Share Valuation and Corporate Equity Policy by Alan J. Auerbach
Journal of Public Economics 11(1979) 291—305.North-Holland Publishing Company
—
SHAREVALUATION AND CORPORATE EQUITY POLICY
Alan J. AUERBACH*
Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
Received December 1977, revised version received December 1978
In recent years many contributions have appeared which examine the effects of corporate and
personal taxation on firm financial policy. However, there has yet to appear an adequate
explanation of why corporations continue to distribute dividends despite their disadvantageous
tax treatment. We study this problem anew, in the context of an overlapping generations growth
model with corporations financed by equity. Among our findings are: (1) capital owned by
corporations may well be undervalued, even in the long run; (2) as a result of such
undervaluation, firms may find it in the best interest of their stockholders to distribute
dividends; and (3) an increase in the tax on distributions, while depressing the return to persona!
saving, may lead to an increase in the capital intensity of the economy. We also consider the
criterion firms will use in evaluating new investment projects.
1. Introduction
In recent years, many contributions have appeared which examine the
effects of corporate and personal taxation on firm financial policy.' One
important aspect of the problem in the U.S. and certain other countries is
the preferential tax treatment accorded capital gains, which are taxed upon
realization, and then only at a rate that is substantially below that on regular
capital income.2 This provision has led Stiglitz (1973) and others to conclude
that, in the absence of uncertainty, corporations should retain earnings as
long as possible, with the eventual recovery of profits by shareholders taking
the form of capital gains. Nevertheless, dividends remain an important
method of transmitting corporate profits, and a framework capable of
explaining such behavior is needed. The chief aim of this paper is to present
and develop such a model.
tThe author would like to thank Martin Feldstein, John Fletnming, Jerry Green, and
Lawrence Summers for discussions and helpful comments on previous drafts, and Anthony
Atkinson for many useful suggestions, which include the ingenious diagram presented in this
paper.
'See, for example, Gordon (1962), Farrar and Selwyn (1967), Pye (1972), Stapleton (1972),
Stiglitz (1973, 1976) and King (1974).
21n the U.S., long-term capital gains are generally taxed at 50 % of the rate on distributions,
there existing various provisions which may make the rate higher or lower for particular
taxpayers.292
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An issue related to the firm financial decision is the proper criterion for
new investment. Tobin (1969) has argued that firms will have an incentive to
invest when the market price of their equity is greater than the reproduction
cost of the capital which the equity represents.
in the present paper we explore once more the determinants of corporate
equity policy and investment. Our economy consists of a large number of
corporations which finance their capital investments solely through equity.
These corporations behave in a perfectly competitive manner. Individuals
save by purchasing shares of stock. The stock's value increases to reflect the
retention of corporate earnings. We assume that all individuals have the
same preferences and face the same marginal tax rates, and that, in addition
to facing the same corporate tax rate, corporations face the same set of
production possibilities.
Absent from the analysis is an important aspect of corporate finance, the
issuance of debt. While, in reality, firms would generally find it advantageous
to achieve a certain degree of leverage, there are various reasons, including
legal restrictions and the possibility of bankruptcy, why firms would wish to
maintain corporate equity at a certain level in their marginal financing. In
the same vein, we have excluded the government and noncorporate sectors as
alternative vehicles for personal saving.
There are a few remaining assumptions we desire to make which will rule out
behavior that is either illegal or implausible. We assume that firms cannot
buy back their own shares It is evident that such a policy strictly dominates the
issuance of dividends, since the sole difference between the two policies is the
rate at which the personal receipts are taxed. However, share repurchases
have historically been extremely small relative to regular dividend distri-
butions in the U.S.,3 perhaps, in part, because of Section 302 of the Internal
Revenue Code which provides for the taxation at the regular personal tax
rate of repurchases deemed to be in lieu of dividends.4 In the same spirit, we
rule out any systematic interfirm share purchases using undistributed funds.
Suppose, for the moment, that firms could pass through share earnings
without additional corporate taxation. Then, by buying each other's shares,
two firms could effectively circumvent the share repurchase prohibition.
Actually, the U.S. tax code exempts only 85% ofdividends received by
corporations, and taxes capital gains at the corporate level. Thus, ignoring
questions of legality, the superiority of interfirm shares purchases over
dividends would depend on the average holding time of such shares.
Regardless of the outcome of this calculation, it seems unrealistic to consider
interfirm investment as more than a negligible use for corporate funds.
The partial taxation of firm-held shares could, in principle, be alleviated
completely by outright acquisition of other firms. However, antitrust laws
3Relevant statistics are cited in Auerbach (1979).
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andother legal constraints pose barriers to such activity and, as in the case
of simple investment in other firms' shares, it is not very plausible as a
marginal alternative.
The above simplifications imply that firms may hold two types of assets:
physical capital and liquid stocks which yield no physical return. If prices
were subject to change or there were costs associated with shifts in
production, there would be valid reasons for maintaining liquidity in the
form of inventories. While we do not rule out such holdings in our model,
we show in the Appendix that they will never be held by firms. Thus, all firm
receipts, coming from profits and the sale of new shares, will either be
distributed as dividends or retained and reinvested in new capital.Our
results indicate that the superiority of capital gains over dividends as a
method of profit distribution depends on the valuation of a share of stock.
We find that, in a steady state, stock may be sufficiently undervalued so that
dividends become an attractive method of distribution. With respect to the
corporation's investment criterion, we concur that firms will finance invest-
ment through the sale of new shares only when share price exceeds
reproduction cost. However, reinvestment of retained earnings will occur as
long as share price exceeds a particular level which is strictly less than
reproduction cost.
The share price which obtains in equilibrium varies in response to changes
in the various rates of taxation. This has important implications for the
return earned by investors, as well as the long-run capital intensity of the
economy.
We present our model more explicitly in the following section. In section 3
we offer an analysis of how share prices may fall below reproduction cost in
a dynamic economy. In section 4 we use comparative statics to analyze the
effects that changes in different tax rates may have on the capital—labor ratio,
return to investors, and share valuation, and illustrate these results diagram-
matically with a Cobb—Douglas example. A few concluding comments appear
in the final section.
2. The model
We examine the characteristics of a steady state in a one-sector non-
monetary growth model with overlapping generations of individuals. We
assume there is no inflation, and take output as numeraire. This output may
be used as capital or consumed, but, once it is put in place as capital it loses
its fungibility and may not be consumed subsequently. Individuals live for
two periods, and the population grows at rate n.Atthe end of each period,
members of the younger generation save in the form of shares. There are no
bequests, so that dividends received in the second period are consumed
immediately, as are the receipts from the sale of all shares held. The value of294 l.J.Auerhach,Share Lah4ation
a firm is the reproduction cost of the capital it holds, multiplied by Tobin's
'q', the ratio of share value to replacement cost. For simplicity, we always
measure shares in units of capital, so that each share has price q. Thus, if
firms increase their value by acquiring more capital, the number of shares
outstanding, rather than the price per share, will increase. The process can be
seen as a stock dividend in which new shares are given to each current
stockholder in such a way as to maintain the amount of capital owned by
each share. This should not be confused with the outside sale of new shares.
Labor supply per capita is taken to be fixed, and labor units are set so
that each worker supplies one unit of labor.
An important issue is the use to which tax receipts are put. One can
imagine several possibilities, including transfers to either or both generations,
the purchase of public goods, or the investment in public projects.5 We
assume for the sake of simplicity that tax receipts are spent by the
government on items which do not affect individual decisions (e.g. military
expenditures).
From the assumption of utility maximization, we may derive individual
demand functions for first and second period consumption. Letting rbethe
after-tax return to savers, second period consumption and saving are related
by
c2=(1+r)s (1)
so that we may derive the savings function
s=s(r,y) (2)
wherey is first period labor income.
Production in each firm is governed by the constant returns to scale
relation
x=f(k),f'>O; f"<O, (3)
where k is the firm's capital—labor ratio. Since all firms are identical and
follow the same policies, k is also the economy-wide capital—labor ratio.
Savers buy shares, each representing one unit of capital, at price q. Thus,
at any time the economy's capital stock is
K =(s/q)N (4)
where N is the population of the older generation at time t. Letting N be
5Feldstein (1974) has demonstrated how the use to which government tax receipts are put
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thepopulation of the younger generation, and hence the supply of labor to
the economy, we know that N,'/N=(l +n), so that
k=s[q(1+n)]'. (5)
There are three taxes of concern in our analysis: the corporate tax rate, t,
assessed immediately on all firm profits; the personal tax rate, 0, on
dividends; and the capital gains tax, c, applicable to gains realized on the
sale of shares.6 We assume that all taxes are between zero and unity, and
that c is less than 0. We also assume that wages are deductible from
corporate profits for tax purposes; perfect competition ensures that firms will
equate the marginal product of labor, gross of corporate taxes, with the wage
rate. Thus, first period per capita income is
y=f—kf'. (6)
Weturn now to the determination of firm equity policy. The firm's
objective is to maximize the return of its current stockholders. If q> 1, firms
may sell new shares, purchase capital, and realize a gain of (q— 1) per share
sold, which may then be distributed to current stockholders or reinvested. If
q<l, firms would lose on each such sale. If q=l, firms are indifferent
between selling and not selling new shares, since no gain or loss occurs.
Thus, firms may be observed offering new shares only if q￿ 1. Since firms
would attempt to sell an infinite number of shares were q> 1, it must also be
true that q￿1. Therefore, firms will offer new shares ortly if q=l, and there
will never be a net gain or loss from such sales on the part of current
stockholders. Thus, the net return per share, after corporate taxes, is simply
the net marginal product of capital, f'(l —r). Since shares cost q, the rate of
return on savings at the corporate level is
it=f'(l—r)/q. (7)
This return may be either retained and reinvested or distributed as a
dividend. If the latter occurs, the return is taxed at rate 0, so that the rate of
return to savings is
rD=f(1—r)(1—0)/q. (8)
If the profits it are reinvested, they may buy f'(l —t)/q units of capital, each
having a share value of q. Thus, the increase in share value, or capital gain,
6Since all gains are realized in the period of accrual, there is no deferral advantage in taking
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resulting, would be f(l —x). After capital gains taxation upon the sale of
shares, this yields a return to savings of
rR=f(1—t)(1—c). (9)
From the fact that firms seek to maximize r,itfollows that they will prefer
dividends, retentions, or be indifferent, according to whether q is less than,
greater than, or equal to q, where
q=(l—O)/(l—-c). (10)
Since q <1, firms in our model will never distribute dividends and issue
new shares simultaneously. When q is between q and unity, firms will not
offer new shares to finance investment. However, they will reinvest all of
their profits in new capital. Thus, the condition that q be at least one is
sufficient, but not necessary, for the existence of new investment. It is
necessary only with respect to the offering of new shares.
To close our model we require that the stock market clear in every period.
This means that shares of stock outstanding must grow at the same rate as
the population, n. Additions to stock come from reinvestment of retained
earnings and the sale of new shares. Thus, defining 5 as the ratio of new
issues to existing shares and y as the fraction of earnings distributed as
dividends, the stock market equilibrium is described by the condition
(11)
It follows from (11) that there will be dividends in equilibrium if and only if
[(1 —r)>n, and new share issues if and only if f'(l —r)<n. It is also
apparent that q may never be less than q in a steady state. If it were, firms
would offer no new shares and retain no earnings, i.e. 5=0 and y=l. Since n
is positive, this violates condition (11). The requirement that q￿q implies,
in turn, that retentions will be at least as attractive as dividends, so that ;.
= rR. Usingthese restrictions, and the various equations of this section, we
may now conveniently summarize the model we are using. The core of the
model consists of four equations in six unknowns, r, k, y, q, 5, and y:
k=s(r,y)[q(1+n)]1, (12.1)
r=f'(1 —r)(1 —c), (12.2)
y=f—kf', (12.3)
n=f'(l —r)(1 —v)+5. (12.4)
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arethree regimes which are feasible, depending of the value of q. For each,
there are additional conditions on q, (5, and y. The regimes, and their
corresponding conditions, are presented in table 1.
Table 1
Equity policy regimes.









For each regime we have two additional equations in the unknowns q, iS
andy which allow us to reduce the number of unknowns in (12) to four, plus
an inequality constraint which must be satisfied by the resulting solution to
(12). For example, for an equilibrium with dividends to occur, the value of y
arrived at by solving (12) for q=qD and (5=0 must be non-negative.
Without characterizing the savings and productiou functions, we are
unable to demonstrate the existence of a unique equilibrium in a particular
regime for given values of n,r,0,andc.7
3.How can stock become undervalued?
We have described above the steady-state behavior of an economy in
which share prices may be below unity, so that ownership of capital may be
valued at less than the reproduction cost of the capital itself. By what
mechanism can this undervaluation come about?
The dynamics of adjustment for the general case would be extremely
difficult to model. However, insight into the probleni may be gained by
examining the simple case in which per capita savings is fixed.
Consider an economy 'just starting up' in which individuals of the first
generation buy sunitsof capital each. At the end of the next period the
stockholders not only have the original sunitsof capital to sell, but also
have profits of sf'(l—i). Aslong as price per share remains at one, the
return will be greater from reinvesting these profits in new capital, rather
7Theoretically, it might be possible for multiple equilibria to exist within a particular regime,
or for equilibria to exist in more than one regime. For the Cobb—Douglas example presented
below, there exists a unique equilibrium for each set of tax values.298 AJfluerbach, Share ialuai ion
than taking dividends. Suppose all of the profits are reinvested. Then the
stock of capital must grow by a factor of f'(l —-r), while the demand for
capital by the next generation is (1 +n) times that of the current owners. If n
exceeds f'(l —'r), all share sales will be accommodated and new shares will
be issued to satisfy any remaining demand. But if n<f'(l —T),notall shares
can be sold. The excess supply of shares will drive down their price. As long
as the price remains above (1—O)/(1----c), it will still be advantageous to the
older generation to reinvest and absorb the lower value of the stock than
distribute dividends. If q falls to q,currentstock owners will be indifferent
between retentions and dividends. The price can fall no more, since this
would eliminate all reinvestment and, as long as n is positive, there would be
an excess demand for shares.
If q <1,then the new generation is able to buy more than one dollar of
capital per dollar of savings. Thus, the capital—labor ratio in the following
period will be higher, and f' will be lower. If f'(l —t)declinesto n, then all
profits can be reinvested and shares can be sold to the third generation at
the price that cleared the market in the previous period, since shares and
savings will have grown at the same rate. If f'(l —-r) remains above n, full
reinvestment will lead to an excess supply of shares at that price, and q must
fall again. If the new market-clearing price is above (1 —8)/(1—c),this policy
remains superior to dividend payouts. However, if the price reaches q, firms
will choose to reinvest only a portion of their earnings, and offer dividends.
This process would continue over time. Eventually, one of two outcomes
would have to occur. If q declines to (1— O)/(1 —c)before J"(l —t) declinesto
n, then dividends will be paid and [f'(I —-r)—n] will remain positive. If f'(l
—) reaches n and q exceeds (1 —O)/(1 —c), then q will stop falling and there
will be no dividends paid in equilibrium.
4.Effectsof tax rate changes
We now examine the general equilibrium effects that changes in the tax
rates t,c,and 0 have on the steady-state values of k, the capital—labor ratio,
r, the return to savings, and q, the share price of a unit of firm-held capital,
for each of the three regimes discussed above. The results are listed in table
2. For ease of exposition, we totally differentiate each system with respect to
f=(1—t), =(1—0), and =(1 —c), rather than the taxes themselves. Note
that the elasticity of any parameter i with respect to any tax j, hasthe
opposite sign from the elasticity of i with respect to J Therefore, we present
the values of —, in the table.
Many of the results depend on the values of 1sr'[1(K/0fh1SY] and zl
(defined in table 2). The first is the uncompensated or 'total' supply elasticity
of personal savings with respect to the rate of return. In theory, irmaybe
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De1initions of variables introduced:
l7= elasticity of i with respect to j,
SL=laborshare of output; =(f—kf')/f,
SK=capitalshare of output; =kf/f,
a=elasticity of substitution; =dIn k/d In (L_hI_),
a
;maIland of uncertain sign. However, Feldstein (1970) has suggested that,
ecause they failed to use the real interest rate, such estimates may have been
)iased toward zero. After compensating for this and other possible problems,
3oskin (1978) has estimated Jxrtobe much larger than previously anti-
;ipated, with a value of about 0.4.300 - .4.1.Auc'rhach, Share raluation
As long as neither first nor second period consumption is an inferior good,
tjispositive. In an economy like the U.S., in which savings is roughly a
fixed fraction of income, tjshouldbe approximately unity. Since SK,the
capital share of output, is about 0.3, [1 —(SK/a)Y] will be positive unless a
<0.3, which is implausible.8
For the remainder of the analysis we assume that ij5and[1 —(Sk/a)rY]
arepositive, as seems likely. These assumptions are sufficient, though not
necessary, to guarantee that A will also be positive.
4.1. Retained earnings and dividends
This is the regime most relevant to current conditions in the U.S., since
dividends are paid out, new share issues are small, and the rate of after-tax
corporate profits exceeds the growth rate.9 Total differentiation of (12) for q
=qand =0yields the results in the last column of table 2.
Of particular interest are the differences in impact of the three taxes on k
and r. The effects of an increase in the corporate tax rate, r, correspond most
closely to those found in earlier work.1° As long as savings is interest elastic,
the lower rate of return induced by the tax leads to a lower steady-state
capital stock. This raises the marginal product of capital, so that the net rate
of return, r, falls by less than the full tax increase. The fraction of the tax
increase which is shifted in this way depends negatively on the degree to
which labor may be substituted for capital in production, as represented by
the elasticity of substitution, a.
Since q equals q in equilibrium, an increase in t has no effect on q.
Because q is determined by B and c, an increase in either of these tax rates
will have a more complicated effect than t on k and r, since q must also
change. (It is easily verified that a simultaneous change in 0 and c which
leaves q unchanged is identical in effect to an increase in t.) For a given
value of q, an increase in 0 makes dividends less attractive than retentions,
and would lead to greater capital accumulation. For equilibrium to be re-
established, q must fall to the new, lower value of q, at which firms would
once again be willing to distribute dividends. On the other hand, an increase
in c would encourage payout of all profits unless q rose. While we are not
attempting to model the transition from one steady state to another, one's
intuition might suggest that an increase in 0 would depress capital accumu-
8Nerlove (1967) presents an excellent survey of attempts at estimating o Time series estimates
for aggregate U.S. production generally fall between 0.5 and 0.7. However, cross-section
estimates offor two-digit SIC industries tend to be much higher than the corresponding time
series estimates, suggesting that the aggregate estimates may be too low.
9The maximum value of in the U.S. is presently 0.46 Feldstein and Summers (1977) have
estimated the marginal product of corporate capital to be about 11 %.Theeconomy's trend
growth rate, taking account of technical change, is lower than the implied value of f'(l —r),
5.94%.
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lationless than an equivalent increase in c, because of these different effects
on q. In fact, an increase in 0 actually leads to an increase in the capital—
labor ratio, while k is depressed (and f' increased) so much by an increase in
c that, for ,j,=1,r increases when o-< 1.
The results for this regime indicate that, once equity policy and valuation
are accounted for, the effects of an increase in capital income taxation
depend on the type of tax change. While a corporate tax increase depresses
both the capital—labor ratio and the rate of return, increasing the rate of
personal taxation, 0, increases k, while an increase in c, the capital gains tax
rate, may depress k so much that r increases.
4.2.Retainedearnings and new shares
This regime, which occurs if f'(l —t)<n, is simpler to describe than the
one above, since q is fixed at unity. An increase in has the same impact as
before. Because q is not a function of c, and since all earnings are retained
and thus taxed at the capital gains rate, an increase in c is equivalent to an
increase in T. Similarly, since there are no dividends at the margin, a change
in 0, the rate of dividend taxation, has no effect at all.
4.3. Retained earnings only
The intermediate case between those already discussed is that in which q is
between q and one, so that all earnings are retained, but no new shares are
issued. Because dividends are not paid, 0 once again has no effect on the
equilibrium values of k and r. Since q is endogenous, the results of changing
x or c are unlike those found in either of the above regimes.
The key to the results lies in the fact that f'(l —r)=n. Thus, an increase in
c can have no effect on the equilibrium value of k, so that it will be fully
reflected by a drop in r. Since this leads to less saving, q must drop to
maintain equality between the capital supplied and demanded in equilibrium.
On the other hand, an increase in -r can have no effect on f'(I —-v), and hence
r, so that f' must increase, and k decline, accompanied by an increase in q.
Thus, an increase in c is fully reflected in the net rate of return, while an
increase in tis,eventually, completely shifted.
4.4. An example
One case in which there is a unique equilibrium for each set of tax rates,
and which may be illustrated diagrammatically, is that in which both
production and utility may be represented by Cobb—Douglas functions. The
production function is written
x=f(k)=ak'3,O<)'3<l. (13)302 ,4.J.Auerhach,Sharetaluatzon
The utility function is
U=cc,',O<c<l.
Utility maximization leads to the savings function
Combining (12.1) and (12.3), and using (13) and (15), we obtain
q =mf'(k),
wherem is a constant, not dependent on tax rates. This condition relates q
to k, and must hold regardless of regime. It is represented by the line labelled
q(k) in fig. 1. It follows immediately that the equilibrium value of k must lie
between the values labeled k1 and k2, since q is between q and one. To
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mdlet k*bethe value of kobtainedby solving (17) for (5=y=O. Sincef"
0, if k<k*theny>O. Similarly, if k>.k*,(5>0.The actual value of kin
quilibrium depends on the relation of k*tok1andk2.Sincekmustbe
;reater than or equal to k1,ifk*<k1,thenk*<kand(5>0. But then we
:now that q =1,and hence kmustequal k1.Similarly,if k*exceedsk2,then
:*>kandy>0, so that q=qDandk=k2. Finally, if k* lies between k1 and
:2,theonly possible regime is that with (5=y=O, so that k=k*andq
=q(k*). These three possibilities are represented in the diagram by the values
:,k,and k, respectively, with corresponding points on q(k) labeled N, D,
nd R. Equilibrium values of rmaybe read from the r(k)curve,which
epresents eq. (12.2).
The effects of tax changes may easily be seen using this diagram. For
xample, an increase in 0 lowers q1, to q, which shifts k2 to k. This has no
ffect unless there are dividends being paid, in which case k increases to k
nd rdropsto r.Adecrease in cwouldalso lower q, but would cause an
pward shift in the r(k) curve, leading to increases in r and r and, in this
pecial Cobb—Douglas case, keeping TDconstant.A decrease in r would also
use r(k), would have no effect on q, but would raise k* [see (17)]. This
'ould increase k and lower q for the intermediate regime, raising the rate of
turn under each of the other regimes.
Conclusions
We have, in this paper, used a simple dynamic model to study the effects
f taxes on corporate equity policy. Among our findings are the following.
(1) Capital owned by corporations may well be undervalued, even in the
ng run.
(2) As a result of such undervaluation, firms may find it in the best
terest of their stockholders to distribute dividends.
(3) Firms will finance investment with the sale of new shares only if share
rice exceeds reproduction cost; on the other hand, retained earnings will be
invested as long as share price exceeds a value strictly less than repro-
Liction cost.
(4) While tax increases are likely to depress the return to personal saving,
iincreasein the tax on distributions may lead to an increase in the
onomy's capital intensity by encouraging the reinvestment of corporate
ofits.
Much work remains to be done on this subject. A more realistic study of
e present problem would incorporate alternative assets, such as bonds and
)fl-corporate capital. Another extension would take into account the
ogressivity of the actual structure, and the existence of investors with
iferent marginal tax rates.''
IIJhaveexplored some of these issues in later work. See Auerbach (1979).304 A.J.Auerhach,Share ealuation
Asstated in the opening section, there are effects cther than tho
considered in this essay which determine corporate equity policy, particularl
dividend behavior. Nevertheless, we believe our results to be an importar
contribution to the understanding of this difficult question.
Appendix
We demonstrate here that, in our model, it will never be advantageous fc
firms to invest in liquidity rather than capital.
Since the market values capital at q, shareholders will gain from a fin
investment in liquid stocks only if the valuation of such stocks is greater p
unit than q. Let this value be denoted q. Now consider the return a
investor can get on that part of a share which represents liquid stocks. If tl
liquidity is taken as a dividend, the investor receives one dollar for every




Since ￿ —0)/(1 —c)>(1—6), risnegative.
If the stocks are invested in capital, the capital will have less value, since
<q. Thus, the return upon sale will be negative. Finally, if the stocks at
held for one period, they maintain their value, yielding a return of zero. Sin
rR=f(l —r)(1 —c)>O, firms will never hold any liquid stocks.
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